The Aquino Legacy Is Peaceful Regime Change

By PAUL WOLFOWITZ

Corazon Aquino, who died of cancer Saturday at the age of 76, will be remembered as the surprisingly tough “housewife” who forced a dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, to leave office after his attempt to steal an election. But she also deserves to be remembered as the leader of the first “People Power” revolution. Her success strengthened U.S. confidence in what was then a new policy of promoting peaceful democratic change, a policy that remains relevant today.

Marcos ruled the Philippines for 21 years, nine of them under martial law. Initially hailed as a reformer, his regime became progressively more tyrannical, corrupt and incompetent, particularly as his health deteriorated and he became dependent on his wife and on the cronies he promoted solely based on loyalty.

Some U.S. officials in the mid-1980s defended Marcos on the grounds that “there’s no real alternative” (though not, as often claimed, because “at least he’s our son of a bitch”). Embassy officials said that the Philippine opposition was weak and expected the U.S. government to do their work for them. But that ignored the fact that continued U.S. support for Marcos was itself discouraging opposition.

Marcos himself was happy to encourage the belief that U.S. support made opposition to him futile. At the same time, he actively eliminated viable alternatives, refusing to name a vice president and jailing or exiling his democratic opponents—most prominently Mrs. Aquino’s husband, Benigno.

Everything changed on Aug. 21, 1983, with the murder in broad daylight of Benigno Aquino as he emerged from the aircraft that had returned him from exile in the U.S. That event transformed Corazon Aquino into the leader of an opposition movement that eventually forced Marcos from power. And it reinforced a change in U.S. policy that would have far-reaching consequences in places as far removed as Chile and South Korea.

The U.S. began to press Marcos for political, economic and military reform. The Reagan administration debated whether this pressure might lead to something worse, as in Iran and Nicaragua during the previous administration. But in the end, the conclusion was that it would be more dangerous if Marcos continued on his current course, which was playing into the hands of a brutal insurgency. As a result, U.S. pressure for reform became stronger and increasingly public over the course of the next two years. Finally, in November 1985, Marcos announced on American television that he was calling a snap election for the following February, hoping to gain a popular mandate that would enable him to deflect U.S. pressure.

Marcos calculated that the deeply divided opposition would split its vote among two or more candidates, permitting him to claim a relatively clean victory. He could not foresee that Mrs. Aquino, dismissed by critics as “just a plain housewife,” would manage to unite the opposition around a single ticket, forcing her main opponent to sign on as her running mate. As a consequence, Marcos had to resort to massive fraud to steal the election. When he moved to arrest some of his own associates on suspicion of disloyalty, more than a million people gathered to block the arrests, displaying the yellow ribbons that had come to symbolize Benigno Aquino and his widow.

The White House warned Marcos against “attempts to prolong the life of the present regime by violence.” Meanwhile, President Reagan’s friend and personal envoy, Sen. Paul Laxalt, reinforced the message in a direct phone call, telling Marcos that it was “time to cut, and cut cleanly.” In the end, Marcos refrained from using violence to break up the demonstrations and instead boarded a U.S. Air Force plane on Feb. 25, 1986, and headed to exile in Hawaii.

While U.S. influence was significant in bringing about this remarkable peaceful transition, the courage of the Philippine people and Corazon Aquino’s leadership were the real impetus. The U.S. helped, not by forcing or imposing an outcome, but by withholding support for Marcos, thus empowering Philippine democrats.

Success in the Philippines encouraged the Reagan administration to continue pressing for democratic reform elsewhere, not only with hostile regimes like the Soviet Union but with “friendly” authoritarians as well. The experience gave the administration confidence that political change did not have to end in violence and disaster. The peaceful democratic transition in the Philippines in 1986 was soon followed by the administration’s decision the following year to persuade President Chun Du-hwan of South Korea to step down and allow direct elections. And it affected U.S. policy in places far beyond East Asia.

The years following the triumph of People Power witnessed a series of remarkable peaceful transitions, in places as diverse as the Soviet Union and Chile, Romania and South Korea, Taiwan and South Africa. The trend continues today despite the resistance of authoritarian rulers (witness Iran’s “Green Revolution”) and some regression on the part of democracies. While these results always depend principally on the people of the individual countries, some credit goes to Corazon Aquino for showing the way and for encouraging a U.S. policy of support for democratic reform. One hopes that U.S. policy continues in this vein and has not returned to a “realist” approach that minimizes the importance of peaceful democratic reform.

President Aquino’s record in office was less distinguished than her record as leader of the opposition. The country today is still a long way from the success that could be expected of a population that is so energetic, hard working and generally well educated. Some people have even become nostalgic for what they now remember as the strong leadership of Ferdinand Marcos.

What they forget is how far Marcos had departed from the promise of his early years in office, and how rapidly he was taking the Philippines down a dangerous path. One of the most notable aspects of the Aquino transition was the spirit of reconciliation that she brought to her office. Despite her personal suffering and mistreatment at the hands of the Marcos regime, she was not vengeful. Nor did she dwell on resentment of past U.S. support for her antagonist. As one of the first senior U.S. officials to meet with Mrs. Aquino, during a visit to Manila in January 1985, I was surprised to encounter no recriminations, only a warm welcome for the new U.S. policy. It was left to Marcos’s spokesman to criticize this meeting with an opposition leader as “interfering in Philippine internal affairs.” That’s what tyrants will always say.

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Mr. Wolfowitz, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, was assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs from 1982-86 and more recently served as U.S. deputy secretary of defense and president of the World Bank.

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